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In 1988, the New York State Health Commissioner was confronted with hospital-level data demonstrating very
large, multiple-year, interhospital variations in short-term mortality and complications for cardiac surgery. The
concern with the extent to which these differences were due to variations in patients’ pre-surgical severity of ill-
ness versus hospitals’ quality of care led to the development of clinical registries for cardiac surgery in 1989 and
for percutaneous coronary interventions in 1992 in New York. In 1990, the Department of Health released hospi-
tals’ risk-adjusted cardiac surgery mortality rates for the first time, and shortly thereafter, similar data were
released for hospitals and physicians for percutaneous coronary interventions, cardiac valve surgery, and
pediatric cardiac surgery (only hospital data). This practice is still ongoing. The purpose of this communica-
tion is to relate the history of this initiative, including changes or purported changes that have occurred
since the public release of cardiac data. These changes include decreases in risk-adjusted mortality, cessa-
tion of cardiac surgery in New York by low-volume and high-mortality surgeons, out-of-state referral or
avoidance of cardiac surgery/angioplasty for high-risk patients, alteration of contracting choices by insur-
ance companies, and modifications in market share of cardiac hospitals. Evidence related to these impacts
is reviewed and critiqued. This communication also includes a summary of numerous studies that used New
York’s cardiac registries to examine a variety of policy issues regarding the choice and use of cardiac proce-
dures, the comparative effectiveness of competing treatment options, and the examination of the relation-
ship among processes, structures, and outcomes of cardiac care. (J Am Coll Cardiol 2012;59:2309–16)
© 2012 by the American College of Cardiology Foundation
Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.jacc.2011.12.051By 1988, Dr. David Axelrod, the innovative New York
State Commissioner of Health, had become concerned
about the frequently 5-fold variation in hospital mortality
rates for coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery in the
state. Unfortunately, the hospital-level information available
at that time was woefully inadequate in terms of explaining
this variation. The dilemma facing the Commissioner and
the State’s Cardiac Advisory Committee (CAC), a group
that was charged by the New York State Department of
Health (DOH) to help oversee the quality and provision of
cardiac care, was to assess relative quality of care taking into
account that some hospitals may have been treating much
sicker patients than other hospitals.
A precedent for solving this problem was the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA), the predecessor of the
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2011, accepted December 17, 2011.Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), mor-
tality studies, which were released annually between 1986
and 1992 (1). These studies used Medicare administrative
data to assign medical and surgical patients into diagnostic
groups. Each group was analyzed separately, and risk-
adjusted mortality rates were developed and released to the
public for each hospital/group.
The HCFA mortality studies were discontinued in 1992
in the face of considerable criticism regarding the use of
administrative data, the grouping of patients, and several
other criticisms/concerns. Because of this reaction to the use
of administrative data for evaluating hospital performance,
the DOH decided to create a patient-level clinical data-
base that could be used to assess institutional outcomes
for CABG surgery while taking into account interhospi-
tal differences in patient acuity. This decision appears to
have been wise because subsequent studies using the
registry data combined with administrative data demon-
strated that the registry data are more predictive of mortality
than administrative data, and that the 2 types of databases
arrive at somewhat different conclusions about relative
hospital quality (2,3).
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literature to identify patient risk
factors that were related to short-
term adverse outcomes for CABG
surgery, and these risk factors were
included in the data system along
with demographics, complications
of care, admission and discharge
dates, procedures performed, and
patient disposition at discharge.
The new registry was used for the
first time to assess hospital perfor-
mance in a 1990 paper published
in the Journal of the AmericanMed-
ical Association (JAMA) (4). This
study identified independent sig-
nificant risk factors for CABG/
valve surgery in-hospital mortality,
as well as the observed, expected,
and risk-adjusted mortality rates
and volumes for all of the 28 hos-
itals (numbered from 1 to 28 but not named) in the state
hat were approved through Certificate of Need to
erform these procedures (4). On the same day that the
AMA paper was published, Dr. Axelrod released the
ames of the hospitals along with their risk-adjusted
ortality rates to the New York Times (5). Although this
as the first public release of the data, hospitals had
eceived their own data for the first half of 1989, and the
990 release noted that the mortality rates for the first
alf of 1990 had declined by 14% from the first half of
989.
Shortly after the publication of hospital mortality rates,
he Long Island newspaper Newsday pressed the DOH to
release surgeon-specific mortality rates to hospitals and the
public. The DOH was reluctant to do this, in part because
surgeon volumes are lower than hospital volumes, and there
is a danger of outcomes being misleading as a result of lower
statistical power. Newsday sued the DOH for surgeon-
pecific information, and prevailed in the law suit. The
AC then recommended that hospitals submit the data in
manner that would make it impossible to identify indi-
idual surgeons. The final resolution was to release surgeon-
pecific outcomes on a rolling 3-year basis for surgeons with
200 cases in that time frame (to accumulate enough cases
o there would be adequate statistical power in assessing
erformance; now, all surgeons with at least 1 procedure in
ach of the 3 years are also included) (6). The first surgeon
level data were released in December 1992.
In 1992, a coronary angioplasty reporting system, now
called the Percutaneous Coronary Interventions Reporting
System (PCIRS) was created, and annual PCIRS reports
have been released since 1997. The Pediatric Cardiac
Surgery Reporting System was developed in 1991, and
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Reporting Systemreports are released periodically.Methodology for Collecting and Reporting
Data/Format of Reports/Information Reported
Hospitals with Certificate of Need approval to perform the
invasive cardiac procedures in New York submit data for
CSRS and PCIRS to the DOH Cardiac Services Program/
University at Albany School of Public Health for cleaning,
oversight of auditing, and analysis. The data elements and their
definitions are determined by CAC subcommittees of cardiac
surgeons and cardiologists, revised periodically, and sent to the
hospitals. All hospitals have clinical data coordinators who
interact with the DOH staff through biannual training and
information sessions and through open access by telephone or
e-mail on specific questions.
Assuring data accuracy. Cleaning consists of minimizing
the amount of missing data through interactions with
hospitals, and ensuring that all patients undergoing the
procedures are in the registry and that their discharge
disposition is accurate. This is done by matching the data
with the DOH’s administrative hospital database, the State-
wide Planning and Research Cooperative System. Auditing
consists of inspection of risk factor coding in hospital
medical records by the DOH’s utilization review agent.
Hospitals are chosen for auditing on the basis of time since
last audit, problems identified in the last audit, and high
reported prevalence of important risk factors in relation to
the statewide average reporting rate for those risk factors.
Additional auditing consists of medical record review by
Cardiac Services Program staff to verify accuracy of selected
risk factors and procedures reported. When minor data accu-
racy problems are detected, hospitals are asked to re-abstract
the data and provide accompanying documentation; major
problems have sometimes led to the DOH requiring the
hospital to pay for the cost of an independent abstractor.
Although this auditing process delays the production of
public reports, hospitals are aware of their own results as they
are submitted. First, because the risk model changes minimally
from year to year, hospitals have immediate feedback on their
approximate risk-adjusted mortality rates for internal hospital
quality improvement purposes. Second, the DOH sends alert
letters to hospitals whose mortality is high during the course of
the year in between reports. These letters have frequently been
the impetus for change within hospitals.
Annual reports. The annual reports contain each hospital’s
volume, unadjusted in-hospital/30-day mortality rate, ex-
pected mortality rate, risk-adjusted mortality rate, and
outlier status (significantly higher, significantly lower, not
different from the statewide mortality rate) for surgeons/
interventional cardiologists every year on a rolling 3-year
basis to accumulate more data. For cardiac surgery, CABG
and valve with or without CABG are reported, with the
valve data reported on a rolling 3-year basis (7,8).
Risk-adjusted data are obtained by calculating an ex-
pected probability of mortality for each patient using a
logistic regression model. Backward stepwise elimination
methods are used along with training and validation samples
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on the full dataset, and the coefficients of the models are
used to obtain the probability of mortality for a given patient
as a function of his or her own risk factors. The probabilities
of mortality are averaged across all patients for each provider
to obtain that provider’s expected mortality rate, and the
ratio of the provider’s expected and crude mortality rates is
multiplied by the statewide rate to obtain a risk-adjusted
rate for the provider (7,8). The 95% confidence intervals for
risk-adjusted rates are constructed to identify high and low
outliers as hospitals with respective confidence intervals
entirely above and below the statewide mortality rate.
In more recent years (since 2004), short-term mortality is
defined as death occurring in the index admission or death
within 30 days of the index procedure, either in or out of the
hospital. In the earlier years, in-hospital mortality was used
as the outcome measure because of the inability to obtain
data on out-of-hospital deaths.
Hospital quality improvement activities related to registry
information. Although many hospitals have not been re-
sponsive to information supplied in the release of risk-
adjusted outcomes information from the cardiac registries,
there have been several reported hospital-specific quality
improvement initiatives related to the release. Three of
these initiatives are described in the following text.
St. Peter’s Hospital in Albany, New York, was identified
as having significantly higher than expected mortality in the
early years of the program (1991 and 1992). The excess
mortality was discovered to be a result of emergency cases,
for which St. Peter’s experienced a 26% mortality rate,
compared with a 7% rate for the state. Elective and urgent
cases at St. Peter’s had roughly the same mortality as the
statewide rate. After a multidisciplinary review of its man-
agement of emergency cases, St. Peter’s concluded that the
patients were not being sufficiently stabilized before surgery.
That led to major changes in the management of these
patients, and in 1993, there were no deaths among the 54
emergency patients who underwent CABG surgery (9).
Winthrop Hospital, Mineola, New York, had one of the
highest risk-adjusted mortality rates in the state in the first
public report, and an outside review commissioned by the
DOH led to probation for its cardiac surgery program. The
hospital hired a new chief of cardiac surgery, who concen-
trated the service on a single floor, hired clinical nurse
specialists and physician assistants who were dedicated to
cardiac surgery, reviewed each case pre-operatively, and
installed a dedicated cardiac anesthesia service (10). Win-
throp’s risk-adjusted mortality rate dropped from 9.2% to
4.6% to 2.3% between 1989 and 1991 (Edward Hannan,
personal communication, April 2012).
Erie County Medical Center, Buffalo, New York, was
another hospital that experienced high-risk adjusted mor-
tality in the early years of the program, with the highest
risk-adjusted mortality in the state for the first 6 months of
1989. A site visit by the CAC led to a series of recom-
mended changes, and the hospital voluntarily suspendedoperations in 1990 to implement these recommendations.
Changes included the establishment of a cardiac surgery
quality assurance program, credentialing and ongoing eval-
uation of surgeon performance, dedicated cardiac anesthe-
siologists and cardiac intensive care beds, and the recruit-
ment of a permanent, full-time service chief (10). The new
chief of cardiac surgery hired new operating room nurses,
cardiopulmonary bypass technicians, and intensive care staff
who were all dedicated to cardiothoracic surgery. The
hospital’s risk-adjusted mortality fell from 7.31% in 1989 to
1991 to 2.51% in 1993 to 1995, just below the statewide
average of 2.57%. The very low annual volume of just over
100 cases rose to 219 cases per year in the 1996 to 1998 time
period, during which the mortality was 1.77% (10,11).
Changes in Cardiac Outcomes and
in Practice in New York
There have been numerous changes in cardiac outcomes, as
well as in factors such as market share, the practice of
cardiac surgery/cardiology, contracting with managed care
plans, and choice of patients that have either occurred or
alleged to have occurred since the inauguration of New
York’s registries and public release of outcomes. The fol-
lowing is a short synopsis of studies related to these topics.
We acknowledge that our interpretation of these studies is
unavoidably influenced by our active involvement as devel-
opers and defenders of the systems.
Changes in cardiac outcomes. There have been a few
studies that have examined the change in short-term CABG
surgery mortality after the release of the New York reports.
For example, Hannan et al. (12) found that the in-hospital
mortality for CABG patients decreased from 3.52% in 1989
to 2.78% in 1992. After risk-adjustment to reflect differ-
ences across the years in patient severity of illness, the
decrease in risk-adjusted mortality was 41% in this time
frame, from 4.17% in 1989 to 2.45% in 1992 (12).
Since CABG surgery outcomes have been improving
across the country and world as a result of new techniques
and processes of care, the most definitive manner of assess-
ing the outcome changes in New York is to compare them
to other regions over the same period. The first such
attempt to do this was a study by Peterson et al. (13) that
used Medicare data between 1987 and 1992 (before and
after initiation of the program) to examine the CABG
mortality rate and changes in the rate. The researchers
found that New York had the lowest risk-adjusted mortality
rate of any state in 1992, and that the decrease in mortality
between 1987 and 1992 was higher than for any other state
with below-average mortality (10,13). A more recent study
by Hannan et al. (14) compared CABG surgery in-hospital/
30-day risk-adjusted mortality between 1994 and 1999 in
states/regions of the country with public reporting and/or
formal quality improvement programs with the mortality in
the remainder of the United States. Results showed that the
risk-adjusted odds for mortality in New York for the 1994
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to 0.77) times the odds in the remainder of the country. In
other words, after adjusting for patients’ pre-procedural severity
of illness, patients in the remainder of the country were 52%
more likely to experience short-term mortality (14).
Avoidance of high-risk patients by not providing procedures
or by out-of-state referrals. Several studies have con-
tended that an adverse reaction to the public dissemination
of cardiac data in New York has been to avoid high-risk
patients by either refusing to recommend cardiac surgery or
percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI), or by referring
the patient out of state. One of the earliest studies of this
nature was by Omoigui et al. (15), who compared the
number and acuity level of New York patients undergoing
CABG surgery from 1980 to 1988 in the Cleveland Clinic
before the inauguration of the New York CABG registry
with similar patients in the 1989 to 1993 time frame. The
investigators found that there was an average of 61.4
patients per year in the first time period, and 96.2 per year
after the founding of the New York registry. Also, New
York patients treated at the Cleveland Clinic were sicker
than New York patients treated in New York (15).
It should be noted that the first public release of New
York CABG surgery data occurred in 1990 and it was not
expected, so the earliest that hospitals would have been
tempted to refer out of state for fear of adverse publicity would
have been in 1991, 2 years after the beginning of the “after”
time period in the study. The expected mortality of the patients
referred from New York, although higher than that of other
Cleveland Clinic patients changed little between the 1989 to
1990 period and the 1991 to 1993 period (10,15).
It should also be noted that in the study by Hannan et al.
(14) that compared Medicare patients undergoing CABG
surgery in regions with public dissemination of outcomes
and formal quality improvement programs with the remain-
der of the United States, it was reported that out-of-state
referrals in New York were lower in 1994 than the remain-
der of the country (9.9% vs. 10.4%) and also lower in 1999
(10.4% vs. 10.5%), so there does not appear to be any
widespread outmigration in New York in comparison with
states without public data releases.
A widely quoted study by Moscucci et al. (16) compared
the pre-procedural severity of illness of New York PCI
patients with PCI patients in 8 Michigan hospitals in 1998
to 1999. The researchers found that New York patients had
significantly lower prevalence of acute myocardial infarction
(AMI), cardiogenic shock, and congestive heart failure than
the Michigan patients. Although the unadjusted in-hospital
mortality was significantly lower in New York than in
Michigan, the risk-adjusted mortality rates in the 2 regions
were not significantly different. Moscucci et al. (16) con-
cluded that New York cardiologists may not be intervening
as much on high-risk patients because of their fear of public
reporting of mortality rates.
There are some reasons why this conclusion may not be
correct. First, although Moscucci et al. (16) demonstrate cthat some risk factor definitions in the 2 systems are nearly
identical, they do not mention definitions of other risk
factors. In particular, shock is defined in the New York
registry as systolic blood pressure 80 mm Hg or cardiac
index 2.0 at the time of the procedure despite pharmaco-
logic or mechanical support. Most definitions of shock do
not require low blood pressure or low output even after
treatment. Second, the prevalence of high-risk conditions is
measured as the number of patients with that condition
undergoing PCI divided by the total number of patients
undergoing PCI. The number could be lower in New York
because there are more low-risk patients per capita under-
going PCI rather than that there are fewer high-risk
patients per capita undergoing PCI.
Another study, by Dranove et al. (17), used Medicare
data to conclude that the severity of illness (measured by
costs in the year preceding hospitalization) of CABG
patients versus AMI patients in New York and Pennsylva-
nia hospitals declined between 1987 and 1994 relative to
hospitals in states without public reporting, as evidenced by
lower hospital utilization in the year before admission for
surgery. Presumably the reason for using this unconven-
tional measure of patient severity is that it is not subject to
surgeon manipulation, is not controlled for in the risk-
adjustment methodology, and could be used by surgeons to
identify lower-risk patients. This presumes that surgeons
would take the time to identify patients with lower hospital
utilization who appeared not to have a commensurately low
severity of illness on the basis of measures that are used in
the risk-adjustment methodology (17,18).
In a more direct and traditional study of Medicare
patients undergoing CABG surgery between 1994 and 1999
in New York, other states/regions with public reporting/
quality improvement efforts, and the remainder of the
United States by Hannan et al. (14), New York CABG
patients had significantly higher prevalence of AMI, age
80 years, emergency admissions, and females than the
remainder of the country. Also, Peterson et al. (13) found
that New York Medicare CABG patients had comparable
prevalence of AMI, congestive heart failure, diabetes mellitus,
and peripheral vascular disease as other U.S. Medicare CABG
patients between 1987 and 1992, and New York patients had
higher rates of AMI, age80 years, and females in 1992 than
in 1989. It is important to note that the prevalence of risk
factors in these studies was coded by hospital personnel who do
not work in the cardiac surgery departments, and are therefore
not as susceptible to manipulation or subtle over-coding of
risks that may bias risk assessment.
Some surveys of surgeons and cardiologists in the state
indicate that they believe that avoidance of high-risk pa-
tients is a problem. Burack et al. (19) reported that 67% of
New York surgeons claimed they had refused to treat at least
1 patient in the previous year, and 18% refused to treat 5
atients. Narins et al. (20) found that 83% of interventional
ardiologists in New York “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that
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chance that patients needing PCI actually received it.
Although there appeared to be no evidence of widespread
avoidance of high-risk cases, cardiologists and surgeons in
the state and on the CAC continued to express concern
about including patients in cardiogenic shock in the com-
putation of risk-adjusted mortality rates. After a recommen-
dation by the CAC, the DOH decided to no longer include
shock patients in the risk-adjusted rates starting with the
2006 report because of the concern that these patients were
not undergoing revascularization as often as it was needed.
However, it was decided to continue to collect data on shock
patients undergoing revascularization to determine the im-
pact of the new policy. In 2005, when shock patients were
in the reports, 83 shock patients underwent PCI, with a
in-hospital/30-day mortality rate of 34%. During the next 3
years, 133, 146, and 138 shock patients underwent PCI with
a combined mortality rate of 45%. Thus, the policy of
omitting shock patients from public reporting resulted in an
average increase of 67% per year in the next 3 years, and the
shock patients undergoing PCI were more severely compro-
mised on average. The trend for CABG surgery was weaker,
with 32 shock patients in 2005, followed by 46, 41, and 43
in the next 3 years. However, the average mortality rate in
the subsequent 3 years was 38%, compared with a 22%
mortality rate in 2005.
More recently, a decision was made to exclude from
analysis and public reporting PCI patients who experience
anoxic brain injury and die of withdrawal of support
subsequent to a documented pre-intervention AMI and
cardiac arrest. Since this policy took effect with 2010
procedures, the data are still being reviewed, and the impact
of this policy change is unknown at this time.
Impact of public reporting on market share. There have
been a few studies that have examined the impact of public
reporting of CABG surgery mortality on hospitals’ future
market shares, and the evidence is mixed. An earlier study
(Hannan et al. [21]) found no substantial changes in
hospital volumes during the course of 1989 to 1992.
Mukamel and Mushlin (22) found that in the 1990 to 1993
period, CSRS reports had a small effect on hospital volume,
but a larger effect on surgeon volume. Romano and Zhou
(23) found that New York CABG hospitals noted as having
significantly fewer CABG deaths than expected experienced
significantly increased CABG volume in the first month after
publication (61 patients predicted and 75 admitted, a 22%
increase). These increases were not seen for non–CABG-
related admissions (23). The latest and most comprehensive
study, by Jha and Epstein (24), found no evidence that
performance in the reports was associated with a significance
increase (for hospitals in the best quartile or best decile) or
decrease (for hospitals in the worst quartile or worst decile) in
market share between 1989 and 2002. In general, each hospi-
tal’s market share remained very similar over time (24). The
differences in conclusions of these studies may be due in part todifferences in time frames that were used, but are probably
more likely due to differences in the methods used.
Whether there are changes in market share or not, they
do not seem to have been strongly impacted by changes in
referrals, at least in the early years of the system when such
information was obtained. In a 1996 to 1997 survey,
Hannan and Stone (25) found that only 22% of New York
cardiologists routinely discussed the report with their pa-
tients, and only 38% of cardiologists used the report card
information for referrals. These findings may no longer be
true, given how dated they are.
Another way that change in market share can occur is by
changes in contracting by managed care organizations for
tertiary services. Romano et al. (26) found in 1999 that
about half of their surveyed hospital administrators used the
report cards in health-plan negotiations. Mukamel et al.
(27) found that 60% of managed care organizations re-
sponding to a 1998 survey ranked surgeon quality as the
most important factor in contracting, but only 20% indicated
that the report cards were a major factor in their contracting
decision. Conversely, a later study by Mukamel et al. (28)
found that the probability of managed care organizations
contracting with a surgeon in the Downstate region of the state
was significantly higher if surgeon was a high-quality outlier or
had a lower risk-adjusted mortality rate.
Impact of public reporting on surgeons. Another
hospital-level activity that was prompted by the release of
the reports was the monitoring and policing of low-volume
surgeons. Earlier publications highlighted the fact that
lower volume surgeons were associated with worse out-
comes, and that became clear with the release of surgeon-
level data (29,30). In reaction to these studies and reports,
some hospitals restricted the privileges of low-volume sur-
geons, and between 1989 and 1992, 27 low-volume sur-
geons ceased practicing cardiac surgery in the state. Some
left the state, some retired, and others restricted their
practice to noncardiac surgery (30). This group’s risk-
adjusted CABG surgery mortality in the last year in which
they practiced in the state was 11.9%, compared with the
statewide rate of 3.1% in that time interval (10).
A more recent study by Jha and Epstein (24) used 3-year
reports (the periods used to report surgeon data) from 1989
to 1991 through 1994 to 1996 to examine the surgeons who
discontinued performing cardiac surgery in the 2-year pe-
riod after the publication of the reports. They found that
20% of surgeons with patient risk-adjusted mortality rates
in the highest (worst) quartile stopped practicing CABG
surgery within 2 years after publication of the reports, in
comparison to roughly 5% of surgeons in the top 3 quartiles.
This was a statistically significant difference when all 5
3-year reports were combined. It is notable that the group of
surgeons with risk-adjusted mortality rates in the highest
quartile all performed 150 CABG procedures over the
3-year periods in the report (24).
Ability to predict performance over time. The ability of
New York’s public CABG reports to predict performance
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studied. This is important because it relates to the use of the
reports to choose hospitals and surgeons. Jha and Epstein
(24) found that if patients undergoing CABG surgery in
1996 selected a hospital in the top decile using the latest
available (1993) data, the mean 1996 risk-adjusted mortality
rate of those hospitals was 1.82%, compared to a rate of
2.89% in 1996 for hospitals that were in the bottom decile
in the 1993 report. Summing data of this nature across 6
years between 1996 and 2002, the mean risk-adjusted
mortality of hospitals in the top decile 3 years earlier was
1.59%, compared to 2.78% for hospitals in the bottom
decile in the index year (24).
Glance et al. (31) used a different method to compare the
ability of the New York CABG report card data to predict
mortality 2 and 3 years later. The researchers compared quality
ratings in 2 different time periods (first 2 years apart, then 3
years apart) on the basis of ratios of observed to expected
mortality. They concluded that hospital assessments made on
the basis of 2-year-old data is a strong predictor of future
performance, but that 3-year-old data may not be useful for
identifying low-performance hospitals (31).
Use of Registry Data for Numerous
Purposes Other Than Producing Report Cards
The registry data have been used for a variety of purposes
other than report cards, including examination of the
volume-mortality relationship for cardiac procedures; short-
term readmissions; comparison of outcomes for different
types of stents; the impact of incomplete revascularization
for PCI; comparison of CABG surgery and PCI; compar-
ison of off-pump and on-pump CABG surgery; develop-
ment of risk indices to use for informed consent and
pre-procedural risk; access to cardiac procedures by race,
ethnicity, sex, and payer; evaluation of the impact of various
processes of care on outcomes; evaluation of the impact of
structures of care on outcomes; geographical variations in
use of cardiac procedures; identification and exploration of
significant risk factors for cardiac procedures; evaluation of
risk-adjustment methods and of clinical versus administra-
tive databases; appropriateness of cardiac procedures; and
improving quality of pediatric cardiac surgery through the
development of statistical models for assessing outcomes,
and the examination of the relationship between processes,
structures and outcomes of care (see the Online Appendix
for a list of references to these topics).
Many of these studies required matching New York’s
CABG surgery and/or PCI registry data with other data-
bases. The registries were matched and merged with them-
selves and each other to create longitudinal databases to be
used to identify repeat revascularization and to compare
CABG surgery and PCI outcomes. They were matched to
Statewide Planning and Research Cooperative System data
to obtain information on readmissions for AMI that did not
result in revascularization, and they were matched to NewYork vital statistics data and to National Death Index data
to identify short-term and longer-term deaths after dis-
charge to measure comparative effectiveness of various
treatment options (e.g., CABG surgery vs. PCI, drug-
eluting stents vs. bare-metal stents).
Summary
The formation of the cardiac registries in New York has
coincided with and likely spurred decreases in mortality
since their inception. There has also been a lively debate as
to whether these decreases have been in part due to the
avoidance of or out-migration of high-risk patients. Our
view is that although there have undoubtedly been some
patients who have been refused procedures, this number is
quite small as a percentage of all procedures performed, and
some of those patients were not viable candidates for the
procedures. In addition, if the assessment of a given hospital
is that a patient may be too high of a risk, then referral to a
hospital with more experience or more resources may be in
that patient’s best interest.
Several other impacts of the New York cardiac registries
(mostly CSRS) have been studied, including the impact on
hospitals’ and surgeons’ market share, the impact on low-
rated surgeons continuing to perform cardiac surgery in the
state, and the ability to use reports to predict future
performance. The evidence on market share is dated and
ambivalent. There does seem to be evidence (also dated)
that surgeons with poor ratings were more likely to discon-
tinue cardiac surgery in the state in relation to other
surgeons, and there is evidence that the reports are reason-
ably good predictors of future performance, although it is
important that they be as timely as possible if used for this
purpose. The registries have also been used to examine a
variety of research topics pertinent to policy issues regarding
the choice and use of cardiac procedures, and the compar-
ative effectiveness of competing treatment options, and have
made many contributions to the establishment of policies
related to cardiac procedures.
Lessons Learned
Regardless of opinions about the pros and cons of public
reporting, it is clear that it is a phenomenon that is here to
stay for the foreseeable future. Consequently, there is a need
to focus on lessons to be learned from existing public report
cards. In our view, the most valuable lessons we have learned
are as follows: 1) it is critically important to assure the
completeness and accuracy of the data being used because
the reports can impact quality of patient care as well as the
success and profitability of healthcare providers; 2) the accep-
tance and use of the reports is dependent on the manner in
which they are presented to providers and the public, and the
degree to which these constituencies are part of the process
of developing the reports; and 3) being an outlier or fear of
being a high outlier/desire to be a low outlier are powerful
motivators.
w
n
m
t
p
i
m
f
h
a
t
f
n
C
C
c
m
a
s
r
o
s
p
c
t
p
p
c
n
p
d
e
t
o
s
n
c
t
o
h
o
o
o
f
s
m
t
r
2315JACC Vol. 59, No. 25, 2012 Hannan et al.
June 19/26, 2012:2309–16 New York’s Cardiac RegistriesIt can be expected that reporting will be either acciden-
tally or deliberately inaccurate in an era of public reporting,
and concerted measures must be taken to assure accuracy
and completeness. During the course of releasing cardiac
data for the past 20 years, we have encountered many
instances of inaccurate data that were threats to the validity
of our reports. In the early years, a hospital submitted 300
isolated CABG cases without a reported death. When these
data were matched to New York’s administrative data, it was
discovered that about 50 more patients had undergone
surgery and 18 of them had died in the index admission.
Other hospitals have reported extremely high prevalence for
some risk factors, but auditing revealed that their prevalence
was very similar to the statewide average. In another
hospital, numerous patients were reported as discharged
alive (when in-hospital mortality was used as the outcome
measure), but it was discovered that they were “discharged”
to an in-hospital hospice that was not certified and died of
complications of CABG surgery.
When mortality after discharge but within 30 days of the
index procedure was combined with in-hospital mortality as
the new outcome measure, hospitals were asked to report
this measure to the registry. Matching these reported deaths
against the National Death Index revealed that the vast
majority of these out-of-hospital deaths were not identified by
the hospitals. Consequently, the National Death Index or New
York vital statistics data in conjunction with the Social Security
Death Master File have subsequently been used to capture
out-of-hospital deaths. The former is preferable as it includes
more deaths for patients under age 65 years, but funding issues
have sometimes required the use of the latter.
With regard to completeness, the best safeguard is to match
the data against another database if possible. In New York, we
have matched the registries to Statewide Planning and Re-
search Cooperative System data. It should be noted that
assuring completeness is probably not a problem when using
CMS data because MedPAR should be complete (for Medi-
care patients) given that it is related to reimbursement.
With respect to accuracy, different methods are probably
necessary to assure the accuracy of risk factors and outcomes
as noted in the preceding text, our experience is that
out-of-hospital deaths should be captured by matching to
death indices. Risk factor accuracy can probably only be
assured by auditing medical records. This is an expensive
proposition, and considerable thought needs to be given to
choosing cases/hospitals to be audited. As noted earlier,
New York has chosen hospitals on the basis of past
problems, time since last audit, and presence of risk factors
in the statistical models with unusually high prevalence.
Because of resource constraints, under-reporting problems
are left to hospitals to monitor (32).
If administrative data are used in the risk-adjustment
process, as is the case with the CMS report cards for AMI
and congestive heart failure, the data accuracy problem is
exacerbated because the International Classification of Dis-
eases codes used in MedPAR are not very detailed, and a lspecified level of severity cannot be assured. For example, in the
New York registry, creatinine levels are used as a measure of
renal failure, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is
defined in terms of expiratory volume, PO2, and PCO2 levels,
hereas the International Classification of Diseases codes have
o clinically objective definition. In general, this means that
ore subjectivity is involved in assigning risk factors to pa-
ients, and this can lead to increases over time in reporting
revalence in an era of pay for performance.
In terms of improving acceptance of reports as well as
mproving their quality, it is important to seek the advice of
ultiple constituencies (hospital administrators, clinicians
rom inside and outside the healthcare system being studied,
ealth policy experts, ethicists, researchers, and so forth)
nd to keep hospitals and physicians apprised of decisions
hat are being made, as well as to provide them with a forum
or making recommendations.
The New York CAC includes several of the most promi-
ent clinicians and researchers in the world, and Chairs of the
AC have included John Kirklin, Kenneth Shine, and current
hair Spencer King. Also, town hall meetings have been
onvened across the state on several occasions to present the
ethods used and findings as well as to entertain suggestions
nd questions. Nevertheless, although the in-state and out-of-
tate members of the CAC are highly supportive of the
eporting systems, there are undoubtedly numerous detractors
f the systems. Surveys, although now quite old, have demon-
trated many complaints and lukewarm enthusiasm (25). It is
ossible that even more concerted efforts to educate the
linicians throughout the state and to accommodate more of
he recommendations may improve satisfaction with the re-
orts. Also, more efforts/resources probably need to be ex-
ended to make the reports more understandable to both
linicians and prospective patients. Furthermore, future reports
eed to include additional outcome measures, including ap-
ropriateness, be tailored to the disease rather than the proce-
ure used to treat it, and possibly include process measures.
Regarding the impetus created by outlier status, the
arlier description of specific initiatives taken by hospitals in
he state to improve their risk-adjusted mortality rates and
utlier status attests to the motivation inspired by outlier
tatus in conjunction with public reporting. There are
umerous other off-the-record reports of hospitals who
oncede that they would not have looked more carefully at
heir processes of care without having been identified as an
utlier or been on the cusp of outlier status. Although we
ave not formally studied the difference in quality initiatives
f hospitals in the middle of the pack compared to outliers
r near outliers, anecdotal information points to the benefits
f potential outlier status in conjunction with data available
or hospitals to investigate the impact of various processes and
tructures of care. Thus, reports that contain very few outliers
ay not have the ability to effect change as much as reports
hat tend to distinguish hospitals from each another. Also,
eports that do not distinguish quality among providers offer
ittle guidance to patients and referring physicians (18).
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The New York “experiment,” on the heels of a maligned effort
by HCFA to release provider data to the public, has proven to
be robust over the course of 20 years, has helped spawn several
similar statewide efforts (33–36), and has served as a model for
current federal and professional association initiatives. Much
has been learned from this experience, but many more chal-
lenges exist to make public reporting of healthcare outcomes as
accurate, informative, and beneficial as possible to patients,
providers, regulators and policy makers.
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